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Executive Summary
The Longfellow Bridge, connecting Boston and
Cambridge, is in bad shape, due not only to its
age and the ravages of our weather, but also to
a troubling and persistent lack of maintenance.
Fixing the bridge, in effect paying the bill for
our unwillingness to maintain it, is estimated
to cost at least $180 million, with the potential
for cost overruns reaching into the hundreds of
millions.
Once the bridge is rebuilt, will we again let
it deteriorate without proper maintenance,
running up another massive repair bill for future
generations? The neglect of the Longfellow
Bridge is symptomatic of a problem that
encompasses almost all the assets owned by the
Commonwealth.
The MBTA, UMass, MassHighway, Department
of Conservation and Recreation, and the County
Sheriffs each have maintenance backlogs
in excess of $1 billion apiece. Overall, the
Commonwealth’s physical assets suffer from a
maintenance backlog in the tens of billions of
dollars. However, the calculation of an overall
state figure is a difficult exercise, as there is
no centralized system for comprehensively
managing the state’s assets. The responsibility
for asset maintenance is scattered across
state government, idiosyncratic in form and
execution, and riddled with redundancies and
ambiguities, particularly regarding the practical
responsibilities of the Division of Capital Asset
Management and the various executive branch
agencies.
No matter which entity is responsible, every
state asset suffers from the same treatment. We
fail to adequately budget for maintenance; even
worse, we actively create perverse incentives
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that discourage state managers from maintaining
state assets.
Any maintenance spending from an agency’s
operating budget reduces funds available
for programs. The postponement of routine
maintenance maximizes operating funds
available in the current year, but also hastens
the failure of capital assets. The eventual
failure of the assets will result in an emergency
disbursement of capital funds, which are under
DCAM’s control and will not impact the
agency’s operating budget. Thus managers
who spend money on maintenance are in effect
penalized for trying to maintain their assets.
There is no comprehensive plan in place to stop
the problem from growing worse. Budgeting for
maintenance simply lacks the inherent political
appeal of new spending on new assets. Every
new structure that is built, every road that is
paved, every new asset the Commonwealth
builds is doomed to decay prematurely through a
lack of maintenance.
This problem will not be solved in a single step.
It will require a sustained, multi-generational
effort. The first step is to stop exacerbating
the problem. We must reexamine our current
practices, including our financial reporting
requirements and our asset management
structure, and determine their impact.
We should also consider the innovations
of other states. Utah and Missouri have
established mandatory set-asides of state funds
for maintenance. Washington and Virginia
have increased accountability and transparency
through comprehensive assessments of
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maintenance needs and regular reporting
on performance.
In addition, alternative contracting mechanisms
have the potential to extend the life-cycle
of assets by contractually obligating proper
maintenance budgeting and execution.
To address its systemic asset maintenance
problem, as symbolized by the Longfellow
Bridge, the Commonwealth should:
- Stop building new assets without first
examining and budgeting for their life-cycle
costs, including regular maintenance.
- Measure the condition of the
Commonwealth’s assets, and present easy-tounderstand metrics of expenditures and progress
in a comprehensive, standardized public report.
Proper measurement of maintenance needs will
also require changes to the state’s accounting

system to allow easier tracking of maintenance,
as well as the adoption of financial reporting
standards that emphasize asset management.
- Budget for maintenance by requiring agencies
to expend operating funds equal to 2 percent
of asset replacement value on maintenance,
establishing a Facilities Maintenance Reserve
Fund, and utilize budgetary surpluses to perform
pay-as-you-go maintenance.
- Execute on improved maintenance practices
by empowering those agencies with maintenance
oversight, providing leadership from the
Governor’s Office, and mandating the usage of
asset management systems.
- Reward managers and department heads with
additional funding if they take a responsible
approach to asset maintenance.

Photo by Christopher Penler
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1. Introduction
Bridges are the physical manifestation of
vital connections between communities. The
Longfellow Bridge connects two economic and
cultural powerhouses - Boston and Cambridge
- yet suffers from such neglect and disrepair
that reconstruction may cost several times more
than the price of simply building a new bridge.
The bridge’s problems, clearly visible to the
naked eye but even more dramatic below the
surface, are symptomatic of a statewide failure
to maintain our public assets. This deferral of
maintenance is caused by a number of factors:
- Unwillingness to prioritize maintenance over
new projects.
- Diffusion of responsibility for assets across
disparate public entities.
- Political incentives that discourage spending
on maintenance.
The result is a wasteful shortening of service
life, a dysfunctional asset construction scheme,
and ultimately, diminished quality of life for the
Commonwealth’s citizens.
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To define the problem and propose a better way,
this paper will present:
- The Longfellow Bridge’s design, construction,
history, current condition and urgent
maintenance needs.
- Hypothetical models of how sustained
investment would have reduced the overall
cost of owning the Longfellow Bridge for the
past hundred years.
- A broader portrait of how the Commonwealth
maintains – or fails to maintain – all of our
vital physical infrastructure, and an exploration
of political and bureaucratic obstacles to
proper maintenance.
- An overview of how other states have
confronted their maintenance needs, and policy
recommendations for the Commonwealth.
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2. The Life of the Longfellow Bridge: 1907-2007
2.1 History
Transportation between Boston and Cambridge
has been important since the earliest days of
English settlement in Massachusetts. Three
structures have been built over the Charles River
where the Longfellow Bridge currently stands.
A wooden bridge built in 1792 was replaced
in 1854 by a second wooden bridge. The
bridge that stands today was constructed out of
granite and steel in 1907. The first bridge was
immortalized in Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s
poem “The Bridge,” which begins:
“I stood on the bridge at midnight,
As the clocks were striking the hour,
And the moon rose o’er the city,
Behind the dark church tower,
I saw her bright reflections
In the waters under me,
Like a golden goblet falling,
And sinking into the sea…”
Massachusetts Governor John Hancock ratified
incorporation of the West Boston Bridge
Corporation in 1792. 1 Construction began on
a causeway on July 15, 1792 and work on a
wooden bridge began on April 6, 1793. 2 The
causeway and bridge replaced a ferry service
paid for in part by Harvard College. The
bridge was 40 feet wide and included a 30-foot
drawbridge that allowed ships to pass by.
The proprietors of the West Boston Bridge
opened it to the public on November 23, 1793.
Tolls were collected for 40 years, after which the
bridge was turned over to the Commonwealth.
Initially, the proprietors were required to pay

300 pounds per annum to Harvard College to
support indigent scholars.
Under an act passed by the Legislature on March
26, 1846, the bridge and causeway were sold to
the Hancock Free Bridge Corporation in July of
that year. The wooden bridge was completely
rebuilt in 1854 and transferred to the City of
Cambridge by an act passed in 1857. Tolls
were no longer charged and horse-drawn rail
cars began using the bridge on March 26, 1856.
This bridge lasted until 1899, when a temporary
bridge was built and work began on the granite
and steel bridge that stands today.
Plans to replace the old bridge began to take
shape in 1890. Since the Charles River was
considered a navigable stream, the federal
War Department had to approve construction
plans for a drawless bridge. President William
McKinley authorized the bridge on March 29,
1890. 3
The new bridge was designed by Edmund M.
Wheelwright, twice director of the American
Institute of Architects and a fellow to the
Boston Society of Architects. Wheelwright
also designed the Boston Public Library,
Horticultural Hall, and Jordan Hall, and was
consulting architect for the Bulkeley Bridge in
Hartford, Connecticut.
The new bridge’s style was inspired by the
1893 Columbian Exposition. The Exposition,
held in Chicago, was a celebration of the 400th
anniversary of Columbus’ founding of the new
world and included buildings from the world’s
great architects.
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With its characteristic towers and stonework,
including ornate sculptures of Viking ships,
the West Boston Bridge was to rival the great
bridges of Europe. The shape of its four
ornamental granite towers gave the bridge its
nickname: the salt and pepper bridge.
William Jackson, Boston’s City Engineer, was
the structural designer. Mortared granite piers
are connected by eleven steel arches, which
support a concrete deck. Two mass-transit rail
lines were later added to the center of the bridge.
Construction began in 1900 with the placing
of 20,168 wooden piles in the riverbed for the
10 stone and concrete piers, and the abutments
on each bank. The construction process is
well documented in the Bulletins of the Boston
Society of Civil Engineers. 4 Almost 17,000
cubic yards of stone granite and 77,421 cubic
yards of concrete were placed prior to steel
erection. Erection of the steel superstructure was
completed by the Phoenix Bridge Company in
November 1904, and surfacing of the roadway
finished approximately a year later. Total cost
for the bridge was $2,654,896, which equates to
$137,809,259 in 2007 dollars. 5

In 1927, upon petition from the Cambridge
Historical Society to the Massachusetts
Legislature’s Committee on Metropolitan
Affairs, it was proposed to rename the bridge
after Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. A group of
Cambridge citizens representing the Historical
Society, lead by Judge Robert Walcott and
Professor Ephraim Emerton of Harvard
University, spoke in favor of the change.
Judge Wolcott read a letter from a daughter of
Longfellow, which said that the poet pictured
a former bridge at the same location when he
wrote “The Bridge”.
Mr. Van Ness Bates of Brookline took exception
to the change at the hearing. He said, “The
present day bridge with the high mass of stone
and roaring trains” would not be in keeping with
the solitude and meditation which characterized
the poet. The Historical Society prevailed,
however, and the name change was made
official. ”His” bridge became another historical
point of interest to the many Longfellow
admirers of the day. 6

Over 100,000 people attended the grand
opening of the new West Boston Bridge on
July 31, 1907. Festivities included a parade, an
invitation-only lunch, a grandstand with 2,000
ticketed guests, a program of speeches and
evening fireworks.
Figure 1: Postcard of the West Boston Bridge
(Source: Applewood Books)
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2.2 The Bridge Today
A century later, the Longfellow Bridge carries
over 49,500 vehicles per day, 7 plus an estimated
97,000 daily MBTA Red Line transit passengers.
This traffic volume means that the Longfellow is
subject to a bridge inspection program. Though
the bridge falls under the jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth’s Department of Conservation
and Recreation, the Massachusetts Highway
Department (MHD) assists DCR with inspection
of bridges under its jurisdiction.
The Longfellow has undergone two repair
projects; first in 1959, then again in 2002. The
1959 project included some structural repairs
and replacements while the 2002 project spent
approximately $1.1 million of the $3.2 million
total on steel repairs and completed sidewalk
and street light safety repairs. About $160,000
was spent on graffiti removal.
The most recent inspection of the bridge was
done on September 21, 2006.8, 9 The inspection
report includes remarks about the major
components of the bridge including: the bridge
deck and approaches, the steel superstructure
that supports the deck, and the substructure
that includes the river piers, granite towers and
abutments. The report also provides remarks on
traffic safety and includes 21 photographs taken
during the inspection.
Bridge Deck
The original bridge deck that supports the
roadways consists of a 3/8” thick steel buckle
plate supporting a 7” thick unreinforced
concrete deck. The deck is supported by a set
of stringers and beams located below the deck.
The checkerboard of structural steel is supported
by posts that carry the load to the arch members

below. The curved arches are the main structural
members of the bridge. Pleasing in appearance
with their graceful curves, they support the
bridge and transfer the loads to the stone piers
in the river. There are ten granite piers across
the river and the bridge ends on each side with a
stone abutment located on either bank.
Figure 2: Generic Bridge Structure Diagram

(Source: Authors)

During the 1959 reconstruction, areas of the
deck were replaced with reinforced concrete.
The 2006 inspection report described some of
the original deck sections as being in “[s]erious
condition with large rust holes (100% section
loss) in the buckle plates with voids due to
deterioration of the concrete deck.” 8 The term
“100% section loss” means that portions of the
arch ribs have corroded to the extent that 100%
of the cross section of the rib is rusted away
and holes appear in the rib. A 50% section loss
would mean that half of the rib section was still
available for carrying load and holes would not
be visible.
These conditions are comparable to those
of many Interstate bridges whose decks are
deteriorating. In those cases, nettings or false
work is put in place below the deck to prevent
concrete deck debris from falling onto traffic
below. Under the Longfellow, any deteriorating
deck debris falls into the Charles River.

				

6

Our Legacy of Neglect The Longfellow Bridge and the Cost of Deferred Maintenance

Figure 3: Longfellow Bridge Deck (Photo by Peter Begley)

Superstructure
The steel superstructure includes stringers and
floor beams that transfer the load of the deck
and traffic through posts to the arched beams of
the bridge. The 2006 inspection report states
that “[t]he stringers are in poor condition with
heavy rusting and section loss.”
Some of the stringers were repaired during the
2002 rehabilitation, but most suffer from severe
section loss. The girders over the approach span
over Memorial Drive outbound also display
collision damage from accidents on the street
below.

7

Figure 4: Beams (perpendicular to bridge)
and Stringers (sections with “x” bracing)
(Source: DCR 2006 Inspection Report)
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Floor Beams

Arch Ribs

The floor beams in all spans show severe
corrosion and some have 100 percent section
loss in the center section under the MBTA
Red Line tracks, which the inspection report
attributes to “[w]ater leaking through the two
longitudinal joints in the median.” Some of
these beams have repair plates from the 1959
rehabilitation. The application of salt and deicing materials to the road surface has intensified
this deterioration. The freezing, thawing and
refreezing cycles of a New England winter also
accelerate the process.

The curved arch ribs are the main pieces of
the superstructure. They consist of 12 curved
riveted girders in each of the 11 spans. Riveted
girders are no longer commonly used for this
purpose; modern bridges use welded structural
steel girders or precast concrete girders. The
2006 Inspection Report notes that “[t]he arch
ribs have heavy rusting throughout with heavy
section loss [in] the top flange outer edges.”
Repair plates have been added to the ribs,
particularly at the ends near the piers where
some of the outer ribs have 100% section loss.
Substructure: Bridge Piers
The substructure consists of the 10 granite
piers in the river and 2 abutments, one on
the Boston side near Leverett Circle and the
other on the Cambridge side along Memorial
Drive. The substructure supports the steel
and concrete superstructure and includes the
visible stone piers above the river waterline
and the stonework and wooden piles below the
waterline. The pier walls display a variety of
cracked and deteriorated mortar joints. Four of
the piers have vertical cracks extending down
through four courses of granite block and some
have vertical cracks extending all the way down
to the water line.

Figure 5: 100% section loss to stringer
(Source: DCR 2006 Inspection Report)
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The bridge’s four distinctive ornamental
towers are located on piers numbered 5 and
6. Within these piers is a large bed of sand
upon which the towers rest. Based on a 2003
consultant’s report, the towers have settled
since construction. The tower on Pier 5 has
settled about 1 to 2 inches and the tower on Pier
6 has settled about 5 to 6 inches. The towers
are leaning due to this settlement and there are
vertical cracks in the granite.
While there appears to be no settlement in
the piers themselves, the settlement of the
towers will require complete disassembly and
reconstruction.

Figure 6: Bridge Pier (below bridge deck)
and Tower (above bridge deck)
(Source: Authors)
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Figure 7: Cracking in Pier
(Photo by Peter Begley)
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Overall design and construction
The Longfellow’s problems are rooted in its
design, and the construction methods used to
build it. There is a reason that bridges today are
built differently than they were a hundred
years ago.
The most significant drawbacks of the
Longfellow’s design involve its foundation
and substructure. The Longfellow is built on
20,000 wooden pilings driven into the bed of
the Charles River. Under current engineering
practice, steel or concrete piles would be
driven down to bedrock, or structural shafts
and caissons would be built. This virtually
eliminates settlement in new bridges.
Water has also affected the granite piers, as
the cycle of freezing and thawing has shifted
and deteriorated the granite blocks. Most
bridges built since 1930 are made of reinforced
concrete substructures with steel or concrete
superstructures. Granite blocks are no longer
used in modern bridges. Block construction
requires frequent repointing of the mortar joints
to keep the effects of moisture from eventually
shifting the blocks.
Removal of the bridge deck and coring and
reinforcing the piers with a new foundation
may be the only economical alternative to
avoid further settling and deterioration. Newer
projects are designed to minimize the need
for such maintenance. For instance, piers for
the Leonard Zakim/Bunker Hill Bridge are
constructed of solid reinforced concrete.
Figure 8: Cracking in Pier
(Photo by Peter Begley)
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3. Neglect vs. Maintenance: Which is Cheaper?
The 2006 inspection of the Longfellow provides
insight into how the bridge has deteriorated
since its construction, despite the two
rehabilitations in 1959 and 2002. It also enables
us to compare the cost of alternate approaches
to stewardship of a capital asset. The first,
involving minimal upkeep and the renovation
or replacement of the bridge after 100 years, is
a fact. The second is hypothetical: How much
could the Commonwealth have saved by taking
proper care of the Longfellow for the past
hundred years? This comparison highlights the
urgency of changing the way we maintain our
infrastructure.

3.1 Estimated Costs of
Rebuilding or Replacement
The 2006 inspection report – or even a cursory
visual inspection of the Bridge – confirms the
need for major renovation. The first public
meeting on the proposed project was held in
May 2006 by MassHighway, and included a
presentation on the extent of renovations needed
and potential construction scenarios. 10 It was
hoped that a final plan could be put in place by
2007 or 2008, in order to allow for construction
between 2009 and 2013.
The bridge is considered safe and not in danger
of imminent failure, but its deterioration
means that action must be taken within the
next few years, before safety concerns may
force its closure. Most urgent are the structural
deficiencies of the stringers, floor beams and
posts, which are rated as “4-Poor,” on a scale of
“1-Imminent failure to “9-Excellent.”
In addition to these flaws in the superstructure,
the reconstruction process will include a
thorough investigation of the substructure,

11

including the piers and the wooden pile
foundation below them. Evaluation must
account for the dead weight of the bridge,
traffic and MBTA train loads, wind and snow
loads and a consideration of seismic impacts. A
best-case scenario would find that the piers and
foundations are still capable of withstanding all
loading conditions. The worst-case scenario
would be that the piers and foundations would
require structural enhancements before the
superstructure and deck can be rehabilitated.
The bridge structure and deck will be renovated
while maintaining most MBTA Red Line rail
service and three of the four lanes of traffic.
The entire bridge deck will be removed and
replaced in several stages, limiting vehicular
and Red Line traffic to alternate lanes while one
or more lanes are under construction. Limited
construction access will increase the time
needed for renovation and may cause some
temporary suspension (on weekends) of Red
Line service.
Structural members, including the arches, ribs
and posts supporting the deck would then be
repaired in place or removed and replaced. The
bridge seats, where the arches sit on the piers,
and the substructure itself may also need to
be replaced in certain locations, which could
further extend projected construction schedules.
The recommended tower repairs are to be
completed by dismantling and rebuilding them.
Once down to the sand base, an inspection can
be made of the granite blocks below river level.
At that point a decision can be made
on whether the base is suitable for rebuilding.
The four towers are located on two of the ten
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piers, but the other eight piers may have to be
similarly dismantled and rebuilt.
The initial cost estimates are preliminary, since
much of the work cannot be precisely estimated
until the foundations are exposed. On January
22, 2006, Jon Carlisle, then of the Executive
Office of Transportation, stated that “[t]he
current $70 million price tag could rise to $100
million.” 11 Currently, the official Massachusetts
Highway Department estimate is $180
million. The report of the Commonwealth’s
Transportation Finance Commission, issued on
March 28, 2007, estimated repair costs at $200
million.12
Given the preliminary nature of these estimates
and the potential for substantial additional
construction depending on the condition of the
piers, it is conceivable that the actual cost of
reconstructing the Longfellow could be several
times the current estimates.
With an approximate total historical cost of $270
million (see table on page 13) plus the current
estimated cost of repairs of $200 million for a
total of $470 million, a new replacement bridge
begins to appear economically reasonable.
However, given the historical and cultural
significance of the Longfellow, the construction
of a new bridge is an unlikely alternative.

3.2 The Road Not Taken:
Two Alternative
Life-Cycle Scenarios
The following scenarios demonstrate that the
massive reconstruction cost of the Longfellow
could have been reduced through a cost-effective
plan of proper maintenance. We will compare
the Commonwealth’s actual investment in the
bridge with the hypothetical impact that proper
maintenance could have had.
As mentioned previously, the total cost for
the bridge in 1907 was $2,654,896, which,
based on the ENR Construction Cost index,
equates to $249 million in 2007 dollars. The
1959 rehabilitation cost an estimated $2
million and the 2002 rehabilitation cost $3.2
million. 8 Although there are normal annual
operational expenditures for routine activities
like line painting and snow removal, these
two rehabilitation projects are the only known
major work performed on the bridge since its
construction in 1907. Some small contracts
have recently been let to improve the lighting
systems on the bridge. Based on the ENR
Construction Cost Index, the $2 million 1959
rehabilitation would be equivalent to $19.7
million and the $3.2 million 2002 rehabilitation
equivalent to $3.8 million in 2007 dollars. Thus
the historical cost to date is $272.5 million.
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Figure 9: Longfellow Construction Costs

			

Date
Cost
					

Cost
(2007 $)

Initial Construction
First Rehab		
Second Rehab		

$249.0M
$19.7M
$3.8M

1907
1959
2002

Total Historical Cost (2007 $)		

$2.6M
$2.0M
$3.2M

$272.5M

This historical cost of $272.5M is an estimate of
the “sunk cost” into the bridge as it stands today.
In other words, this is what has been spent on
the bridge, in 2007 dollars, over its 100-year
lifespan.
The concept of Life-Cycle Costs (LCC) is an
important component of an investment decision
for initial construction of any facility. 11B LCC
encompasses all relevant costs over a designated
study period, including the costs of designing,
purchasing/leasing, constructing/installing,
operating, maintaining, repairing, replacing and
disposing of a particular building or system.
The effect of maintenance spending on the
reduction of the cost of deferred maintenance
with time is widely accepted. 13 In general,
maintenance investments are more cost effective
early in the life of the asset. For any asset, it
is expected that there is a 40 percent drop in
quality over 75 percent of its lifetime, followed
by a more precipitous drop in the final quarter of
the asset’s life. Since deferred maintenance is
the compounded effect of deferring maintenance
from one year to the next, the cost of deferred
maintenance in year one will increase

13

significantly in every subsequent year. De
Sitter’s “Law of Fives” 14 estimates that if
maintenance is not performed, then repairs
equaling five times the maintenance costs
are required; if the repairs are not made, the
rehabilitation costs will be five times the
repair costs. Thus the compounding effects of
deferring maintenance are dramatic, especially
for an asset as old and neglected as the
Longfellow Bridge.
As figure 11 shows, maintenance can restore
the condition of an asset before its condition
reaches the inflection point and begins to decline
rapidly. At the other extreme, the effect of
not maintaining an asset is sometimes called
“running to ground.” Once an asset exceeds its
useful life, investment in maintenance is often
fruitless unless major renovation is undertaken.
The Longfellow Bridge suffers from a lack of
annual maintenance compounded over many
years. Major repairs were undertaken in 1959
and a facelift done in 2002, but years of neglect
have caught up with the structure. To determine
what could have occurred had a planned and
funded maintenance program been in effect,
we will describe three scenarios that evaluate
different levels of investment in maintenance.
Maintenance practices in the private sector
have evolved considerably over the years.
Most companies now implement some form
of Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM),
which predicts and prepares for future
maintenance requirements. 15
Scheduled restoration is an essential component
of RCM. Rather than waiting for a facility to
begin to fail, renovation/restoration projects
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Figure 10: Condition vs Age Curve for General Assets showing the Effects of Maintenance 			
Activities on the Condition of the Asset (Source: Based on Roberta Reese’s GASB Reporting
		
Model from July 13, 2006 ASCE/USACE Workshop on Condition Assessment)
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are scheduled during a slack or
non-emergency period.
Researchers are now considering the application
of RCM principles to public-sector asset
maintenance. Risk analysis, reliability
assessment, and computer modeling have
enabled better predictions of the actual costs of
various maintenance scenarios. For example,
it has been estimated that if all public assets in
Canada were renewed at the end of their service

life, then approximately $196.5 billion would
be required each year to maintain and replace
Canada’s estimated $5.5 trillion current built
assets. 16
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Recent advances in facility management have
lead to the development of a standard set of
definitions for asset lifecycle models. In order
to prioritize maintenance activities, “condition
indexing” describes the current condition of the
asset and enables more accurate budgeting. 17
In particular, the facility condition index
(FCI) has become a useful tool for capital
asset planning. The FCI is equal to the amount
of deferred maintenance plus any capital
improvements required, divided by the current
replacement value of the facility. If no capital
improvements are required, such as building
code upgrades or program changes, then the FCI
is simply the amount of deferred maintenance
divided by the replacement value. An FCI of 0
to 5% is considered good condition. 18 An FCI of
6% to 15% is fair condition, and above 15% is
poor condition.
This calculation also provides a corresponding
rule of thumb for the annual reinvestment
rate (funding percentage) required to prevent
expansion of the deferred maintenance backlog.
19 In Minnesota, for instance, the Statewide
Facility Management Group recommended
a annual reinvestment rate of 2.82% of the
replacement cost. Current actual spending is at
a rate of 1% due to budgetary constraints.
To apply the concept of annual reinvestment
to the Longfellow Bridge, scenarios were
developed for an annual reinvestment rate of
1% per year, another at 2.5% per year, and as
the actual scenario of 0% reinvestment over 100
years, with two renovation projects.

15

The percentages in the first two scenarios were
selected based on their relevance to existing best
practices. At higher maintenance investment
levels, (e.g. five percent per year), the facility
is maintained in pristine condition and savings
from maintenance are negative. This would be
similar to taking your car to the shop when no
repairs were needed.
In order to estimate the savings from past
maintenance, the results of a Lifetime Extending
Maintenance Model were used. 20 The model
is based on the study of sixteen concrete deck
bridges with applied road salt and freeze-thaw
conditions. The condition model used in the
validation model was:
b

		

y = c − at

Where:
		
		
		

y = condition
c = start condition (100%)
a = constant
b = power constant

The Lifetime Extending Maintenance Model
attempts to estimate the impact of maintenance
spending on the decline of an asset’s condition.
The estimated condition resulting from a 1%
investment in maintenance was approximated
at 60% of start condition c, thus the penalty
for deferred maintenance is the cost of a
renovation that would restore the bridge’s 40%
decline from start condition c. The estimated
condition resulting from a 2.5% investment in
maintenance was approximated at 80% of c, thus
any catch-up restoration efforts would only need
to counteract the loss of 20% of start condition.
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Scenario 1

Scenario 3

Annually invest 1 percent of the bridge’s
capital cost in a maintenance program. If
an investment in maintenance of 1 percent
occurred each year, that would have resulted in
total lifetime maintenance spending of $62.7
million in 2007 dollars. With the addition of a
projected $80 million in current rehabilitation
costs (equal to 40% of the estimate), the total
savings (relative to the actual scenario) would
be approximately $80.8 million.

The actual scenario: no annual maintenance
program but a major rehabilitation in 1959
followed by another facelift in 2002. Capital
depreciation is assumed to be 100 percent of the
rehabilitation cost, currently set at $200,000,000.
The total cost to keep the bridge in good repair
is $223.5 million in 2007 dollars.
Clearly, regular maintenance will keep an asset
in better condition than occasional maintenance
or no maintenance at all. Also, maintenance
dollars spent early in the life of an asset have
greater leverage than those spent towards the
end of an asset’s life. Other lessons from the
scenarios are described on page 17.

Scenario 2
Annually invest 2.5 percent of the bridge’s
capital cost in a maintenance program.
Maintenance spending at a rate of investment
of 2.5 percent each year would have resulted
in total lifetime maintenance spending of
$156.8 million. With the addition of projected
rehabilitation costs, equal to 20% of the
estimate, the total savings would be
$26.7 million.

Figure 11: Summary of Maintenance Scenarios (% asset value spent annually on maintenance)

				

Scenario 1 (1%)

Scenario 2 (2.5%)

Maintenance Cost				
$62.7M
Current Cost to Rehab
$80.0M
Total Cost to Return Bridge to Good Repair $142.7M		
Estimated Savings from Maintenance

$80.8M

Scenario 3 (0)

$156.8M
$40.0M
$196.8M		
$26.7M

				

$23.5M
$200.0M
$223.5M
N/A
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Figure 12. Degradation Curve (Source: Based on Roberta Reese’s GASB Reporting Model from July 13, 2006 ASCE/
Degradation
USACE Workshop on Condition Assessment and Author’s
Calculations)
120

100

Acceptable Condition Level

Asset Condition

80

Scenario 2
Maintenance at
2.5% per year

Good Condition

Scenario 1
Maintenance
at 1% per year

60

40

20

Scenario 3
Actual
Condition

Poor Condition

0
0

20

40

60

80

100

120

Time

Lessons from the three scenarios
- Early maintenance is more cost-effective
than later maintenance. By spending regularly
early in the life of the asset, high replacement
costs in the future can be avoided.
- Maintenance is cost effective, and more
so as the reconstruction price increases.
The current scenarios are all based on the base
case reconstruction cost of $200 million. If
that figure increases, so will the savings from
maintenance.
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- Regular maintenance improves the service
level of the asset. While the Longfellow is
not in danger of collapse, it is a minimally
functional bridge, an eyesore with visible holes
in its deck, periodically dropping debris into the
river below. If we want our assets to contribute
more to the Commonwealth’s quality of life,
then regular maintenance is essential.
- Regular maintenance is more palatable
from a budget perspective than major
repairs. The Commonwealth has grappled for
several years with the need to fund massive
repairs on the Longfellow. It would have been
easier (and more cost effective) to find room
in the budget for regular maintenance
payments rather than a large lump sum to
repair the structure.
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4. The Real Cost of Neglect: A Statewide Crisis
The Longfellow Bridge is a dramatic example
of the cost of deferred maintenance. While
we have focused on a highway bridge as an
example, neglect threatens all types of public
assets throughout the Commonwealth.

4.1 The Extent of our
Maintenance Backlog
The many agencies and authorities of the
Commonwealth own a huge spectrum of
assets, from hospitals to parks to dormitories
to beaches. According to the Massachusetts
Division of Capital Asset Management’s 21
Report on Real Property, dated September 2006,
the Commonwealth owns 78,838,841 square
feet of buildings and 611,594 acres of land. In
the June 2006 Comprehensive Annual Finance
Report, the Comptroller’s Office estimates the
total depreciated value of state assets at $24.9
billion. Almost all of these assets suffer from
deferred maintenance or lack proper planning
and funding to keep them properly maintained.
The Office of Facilities Maintenance at DCAM
maintains that the state’s overall backlog of
deferred maintenance is $2.2 billion. 22
The problems caused by inadequate
maintenance of public infrastructure plague all
levels of government. Since asset deterioration
occurs gradually, there is a tendency to
defer preventative maintenance. Treating
maintenance as a discretionary expense,
combined with a diffusion of responsibility and
outright inability to monitor asset condition,
results in a massive and growing
maintenance backlog.

Figure 13 lists deferred backlog estimates for
Massachusetts public entities, using publicly
available studies and statements from each
agency. It should be noted that there are
variations in methodology across each estimate,
so the aggregate number should not be regarded
as precise; rather it is a rough estimate of
the Commonwealth’s deferred maintenance
problem.
Note that this table is only a snapshot of our
current maintenance backlog. Other recent
studies have found comparable problems
throughout state government. For instance,
the Judiciary has just completed a condition
assessment on its 113 facilities. Sixty-eight
have deferred maintenance issues that need to be
addressed. 23 This work is estimated to cost $500
million.
As for highway assets, MassHighway lists,
under its structurally deficient (SD) bridge
program, 501 structurally deficient bridges as
of November 2006. 18b 232 of these bridges are
being evaluated for repair, and of these 129 are
undergoing repair construction. An investment
of $200 million per year is planned to reduce the
number of structurally deficient bridges to 443
by 2010.
The Transportation Finance Commission report
has also estimated a “funding gap” based on an
analysis of needs and resources over an extended
period of time. 24 The TFC’s “gap” is a projection
of future needs; the table below lists estimates
of what state entities need today, to clear the
maintenance backlog they already have.
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Figure 13: Estimates of Maintenance Backlogs for State Entities.

Entity					

Source				

Backlog Estimate ($B)

MassHighway - Pavement		

MHD 5 Year Pavement Condition Tables		

$6.2

MBTA					

April 2007 PMT Advisory Board Meeting		

$2.7

UMass (Amherst Campus)		

UMass 2007 Financial Indicators Report		

$1.6

DCR					

11/12/06 Boston Globe Article			

$1.3

State and Community Colleges

11/06 Roadmap					

$1.2

Other UMass Campuses 		

UMass 2007 Financial Indicators Report

$1.1

MassHighway - Bridges		

10/06 Performance Report				

$1.1

County Sheriffs			

Authors’ Estimates		

Trial Court				

Gienapp Design Associates 6/26/07 Report

$.5

Mass Pike - Bridges			

5/15/07 Press Report					

$.4

>$1.0*

Other – MWRA, Massport, RTAs, Steamship Authority				
Total Maintenance Backlog							

Unknown

At least $17 billion

* County Sheriffs have a massive backlog of maintenance that is difficult to measure. Most jail facilities operate in
excess of stated capacity and many are not in compliance with all relevant Department of Public Safety and Department
of Public Health regulations. An effort to comply with all applicable regulations would be a multi-billion dollar effort.

While there are pockets of excellence on
maintenance issues, notably the efforts of
DCAM’s Office of Facilities Maintenance and
MassHighway’s PONTIS system, there appears
to be no high-level awareness of the magnitude
of the problem of deferred maintenance, or any
comprehensive statewide effort to address it in
either the legislative or the executive branch of
state government. The table above includes data
from at least nine separate reports and reporting
systems, indicating the bureaucratic obstacles
to any comprehensive statewide maintenance
program.
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4.2 Political and Bureaucratic
Barriers to Reform
Just as the Longfellow Bridge symbolizes the
cost of deferred maintenance, the question
of who’s responsible for the bridge also
highlights a statewide problem. The bridge
was initially constructed by the cities of
Boston and Cambridge, and then operated
by the Metropolitan Park System. In 1923,
the Metropolitan Park System became the
Metropolitan District Commission (MDC),
which took on the original work of the Boston
water and sewer boards.
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In 2003, MDC was merged with the Department
of Environmental Management to become the
Department of Conservation and Recreation
(DCR). This new entity took on responsibilities
for state forests and parks, while also overseeing
a large portfolio of transportation-related assets,
including 164 pedestrian and vehicular bridges.
Under an agreement with MassHighway, eight
of DCR’s facilities are to be rehabilitated at
an estimated cost of $397M. They are the
Longfellow Bridge, Storrow Drive Tunnel,
Woods Memorial Bridge, Craigie Drawbridge,
Craigie Dam, Craddock Bridge, Gilman Street
Bridge and the Lech Walesa Bridge. Ownership
would remain with DCR, but responsibility for
design and construction would be in the hands
of MassHighway.
As for other state assets, DCAM has some
statutory oversight of maintenance activities
for state agencies and building authorities.
However, the relevant statutes, (Massachusetts
General Law, Chapter 7, sections 39A - 43I)
make a critical distinction between state
agencies and public agencies. Public agencies
are defined to include authorities and other
non-executive branch entities. DCAM has only
limited ability to compel record-keeping and
reporting from public agencies.
The statutory responsibility for maintenance sits
with each agency, which is typically charged
with the ”care,” ”control,” or ”“supervision” of
its facilities. For instance, the commissioner
of the Department of Public Health is charged
with “general supervision and control” of its
hospitals. 25 At the University of Massachusetts,
the trustees are to:

…manage and administer the university
and all property, real and personal,
belonging to the commonwealth and
occupied or used by the university,
and shall keep in repair houses, 		
buildings and equipment so used
or occupied. 26
This placement of responsibility creates a
conflict, as agency managers and overseers
face incentives to spend scarce budget dollars
on operations, not maintenance. Meanwhile,
facility managers, who are most attuned to
maintenance needs, report to agency managers
who may not share their priorities.
For state agencies, DCAM’s primary statutory
role is in enforcing standards (contained in
MGL Chapter 7, Section 43C). This section
provides for yearly reporting of compliance with
maintenance standards and empowers DCAM to
perform regulatory inspections. An escalating
series of sanctions are provided for, including a
take-over of an agency’s maintenance operations
by DCAM until standards are met.
As a practical and political matter, DCAM has
not utilized these powers. It lacks the funding,
staff, and political power to effectively collect
money from another agency and manage their
maintenance operations for any length of time.

4.3 Attempts to Reduce the 		
Backlog
Given the diffusion of responsibility for assets, it
is no surprise that the Commonwealth does not
have one system to adequately inventory assets,
assess their condition, or estimate the cost of
deferred maintenance.
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In the case of the Longfellow Bridge, the
MDC (now DCR) had no formal inventory
systems until two years ago. Now they are
utilizing FAMIS, the Facility Administration
and Maintenance Information System, for
their own assets, with the exception of major
bridges including the Longfellow. With MHD’s
assumption of responsibility for the Longfellow,
the bridge (and several other DCR bridges)
will now become part of the PONTIS bridge
maintenance system.
PONTIS was developed by the Federal Highway
Administration. The software was made
available to states in 1991 and incorporated into
the American Association of State Highway and
Transportation Officials (AASHTO) software
product line in 1995. PONTIS includes data and
analytical models for an inventory of the state’s
bridges including condition data, engineering
and economic models to include deterioration
prediction models, an array of improvement
options and updating procedures, according to
the USDOT Asset Management Primer. Thirtyseven states, including Massachusetts, have
procured a license to implement PONTIS.
PONTIS and FAMIS each serve as asset
management systems for relatively limited
classes of assets. The asset management system
with the broadest reach is CAMIS, operated by
DCAM. CAMIS is a comprehensive Capital
Asset Management Information System that
uses the same base software as FAMIS. In a
1999 Supplemental Budget, the Massachusetts
Legislature appropriated $18 million for a
statewide asset survey, which was conducted by
Parsons Brinckerhoff in 2000-2001. CAMIS
survey data of over 5000 buildings, comprising
more than 73 million square feet of space, is
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used to inform and support capital planning and
decision-making.
In addition to CAMIS, DCAM has built up
its maintenance-related programming. It has
established an Office of Facilities Management
(OFM) and it has begun a facility selfassessment program for state buildings. OFM
has organized the Massachusetts Facilities
Managers Association (MAFMA) to promote
the wise use of assets and their maintenance and
to promote the use of CAMIS as an operating
tool. However, as noted above, DCAM has
limited statutory and practical powers to
improve maintenance practices across all of
state government.
CAMIS was made available to all executive
branch agencies, higher education schools, and
the judicial branch. Buildings owned by our
public authorities, including MBTA, MTA,
MWRA, MassPort, etc. have been excluded
from the use of CAMIS as a management tool.
Also excluded are all college and university
buildings owned by the Massachusetts State
College Building Authority or the University
of Massachusetts Building Authority, which
include certain dormitories, athletic centers,
and dining halls. 27
CAMIS provides an array of asset management
services, including the cataloging of deferred
maintenance, the production of preventive
maintenance orders, and the transmittal of
service requests. While all major facilityowning agencies in the Executive Branch use
CAMIS to some extent, its features have not
been fully utilized across state government.
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5. Strategies for Effective Asset Maintenance
5.1

Remove Disincentives for
Maintenance Budgeting

Maintenance spending is currently bifurcated
between the operating budget (where many
departments spend their own funds on
maintenance) and the capital budget. For
many of the buildings and other non-highway
structures in state government, DCAM spends
its own capital funds for maintenance projects.
This bifurcation creates a disincentive for
agency heads and program managers to spend
on routine maintenance. Any maintenance
spending from an agency’s operating budget
reduces funds available for programs. The
postponement of routine maintenance
maximizes operating funds available in the
current year, but also hastens the failure of
capital assets. The eventual failure of the assets
will result in an emergency disbursement of
capital funds, which are under DCAM’s control
and will not impact the agency’s operating
budget. Thus managers who spend money on
maintenance are in effect penalized for trying to
maintain their assets.
These disincentives for maintenance should
be removed by rewarding agency leaders who
keep their assets in good condition. An accurate
database and reporting system, such as CAMIS,
should serve as the basis for any system of
rewards. Such a system would evaluate each
agency’s ability to properly maintain assets, and
direct incentive funding to those entities that
have demonstrated a track record of
responsible stewardship.

5.2

Explore Innovative 		
Contracting

There is a robust public debate about the utility
of different contractual forms to shift risk,
cost, and control from the public sector onto
the private sector. The traditional process for
construction is a three-step process of designbid-build, with a separate procurement process
for each step. Several innovative methods
combine multiple steps in the process. The text
box below describes several of these methods.
Each method provides a potential advantage
for the state, including access to financing,
faster execution of projects, outsourcing
of maintenance responsibility or greater
accountability for construction quality. The
inclusion of life-cycle costs and a plan for
extended maintenance at the outset of a project,
during the financing, design and construction
stage, will insure that an adequate maintenance
plan is in place and can be funded.
Along with these positive attributes, potential
shortcomings should also be considered,
such as a perceived or actual loss of control
of assets. This section does not address that
broader debate. It is intended to examine
how innovative contracting has the potential
to embed life-cycle costs into every project,
ensuring that adequate maintenance is planned
and funded.
It should also be noted that current state law
prevents the regular utilization of most of these
techniques without special legislation. Most
of these contracting methods would require the
suspension or amendment of several state laws,
including sections of the public construction

				

22

Our Legacy of Neglect The Longfellow Bridge and the Cost of Deferred Maintenance

laws (Chapter 149 of the Massachusetts
General Laws), procurement laws (Chap. 7 and
Chap. 30B) and public works construction law
(Chapter 30, Section 9M).

Several innovative methods of construction contracting, financing and operation are currently being
used throughout the United States and elsewhere. These include:
Build-Lease-Transfer - Similar to design-build, the facility is leased by the contractor to the
government after construction. The lease pays the contractor for construction costs of the facility.
During the lease, the government operates the facility. After the lease period, the government may or
may not assume operation and maintenance to the facility. This method would provide an incentive for
higher quality construction (with expected result of lower maintenance costs) as the contractor would
pay for maintenance previous to the transfer.
Design-Build-Operate - a firm would design and build the facility and then operate it for a period of
years. The quality of construction would be expected to be high since the contractor would pay for the
cost of maintenance of the structure. The government owns the facility and may or may not assume
maintenance at the end of the period.
Build-Operate-Own - This arrangement is similar to the previous example except that here the
private sector contractor retains ownership of the facility. This practice would place responsibility for
maintenance on the owner, and funding for life-cycle costs would be embedded in the initial price of the
project or on-going lease payments.
Lease - For existing facilities, the government can provide the contractor with a leasehold interest in the
asset. The contractor makes improvements and operates and maintains the asset in agreement with terms
of the lease.
Concession -The government grants the contractor exclusive rights to provide, operate, and maintain
an asset over a long period of time. The government maintains ownership of the asset, but maintenance
standards are embedded in the contract and are the responsibility of the contractor.
Divestiture - The government transfers (sells) all or part of an asset to the private sector. Conditions of
sale provide for continued services, maintenance and operation.
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5.3 Dedicate Statewide Oversight
and Funding to Maintenance

maintain existing conditions or make
needed upgrades.

In some states, the maintenance of facilities has
become an integral and automatic part of state
budgeting. This section provides an overview of
how Missouri, Utah, Washington, and Virginia
have addressed their facilities maintenance
problems. The State Infrastructure Bank
program, created through federal legislation,
has also shown promise. Massachusetts has
explored similar approaches, as explained
below, with uneven success.

Utah

Missouri
Missouri established a separate fund for
maintenance in 1998. 28 In the program’s first
fiscal year, one tenth of one percent (0.1%) of
the general fund was deposited in the Facilities
Maintenance Reserve Fund (FMRF). This
percentage has increased by one tenth of one
percent each year until the FMRF reaches 1%
of the general fund in 2007. Thereafter, it will
continue to receive 1% of the general fund every
fiscal year.
By comparison, Massachusetts expects $17.85
billion to flow into its General Fund in fiscal
year 2008, therefore a fully funded contribution
of 1% to a Facilities Maintenance Reserve Fund
would be $178.5 million, and the initial payment
(at 0.1%) to phase in a fund would be $17.85
million.
Missouri withdraws money from the fund on an
as-needed basis. This requires each department
to review the condition of facilities under their
control and estimate the costs for repairs to

The state of Utah has been working on the
problem of deferred maintenance for almost
15 years. The first step was the creation of the
Facilities Condition Analysis Program. The
state contracted with ISES Corp of Atlanta,
GA to do an initial condition assessment of
all state facilities. Legislation was passed that
established standards for evaluating condition
and funding for capital improvements. 29
The statute defines “capital improvements” as
any remodeling, alteration, replacement or repair
project with a cost of less than $1.5 million; a
site or utility improvement with a total cost of
less than $1.5 million; or a new facility with a
total construction cost of less than $250,000.
“Capital developments” are defined as any
remodeling, site or utility projects with a total
cost of $1.5 million or more, new facility with
a construction cost of $250,000 or more; or
purchase of real property where an appropriation
is requested to fund the purchase.
The law prohibits the Legislature from
funding design or construction of any new
capital development projects until they have
appropriated 1.1% of the replacement cost of
existing state facilities to capital improvements.
While such a binding restriction would most
likely not pass the Massachusetts Legislature,
it would serve as a useful tool to prioritize
maintenance.
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New construction accounts for about 8.5 percent
of Utah’s $1.6B FY 2008 capital and debt
service budget. Under the law $10,138,600 is
set aside for capital improvements.
The capital improvement funds are administered
by Division of Facilities and Construction
Management. Agency projects are funded based
on priorities from a Facility Condition Analysis
database, maintained and upgraded each year
by ISES Corp. There are four categories of
projects: Plant Adaptation, Capital Renewal,
Deferred Maintenance, and O&M. These
projects are prioritized based on the urgency of
the asset’s needs:
1. Immediate
2. Within one year
3. Two-to-five years
4. Six-to-ten years.
Kent Beers, Utah Director of Capital Planning,
notes that for new capital development projects,
funding is a “free for all,” but for capital
improvement projects the state now has a
“condition planning tool.” In discussions with
legislators, he often equates this to the need to
change the oil in your car. Better to do that, he
says, than have to buy a new engine.
As a state that uses the GASB 34’s modified
approach to address infrastructure assets, Utah
has shown leadership in addressing deferred
maintenance. (See text box on page 30 for a
summary of GASB 34.)
This affects not only their budget documents but
also their financial reporting documents. The
State’s Comprehensive Annual Financial Report
(CAFR) includes Required Supplementary
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Information on the infrastructure assets (roads
and bridges) of the Utah Department of
Transportation (UDOT). A description of the
pavement management system for roads and
the structures inventory system for bridges is
provided along with condition levels for the last
three years. Tables showing actual costs over
the last five years and an estimate of the costs
to maintain and preserve roads and bridges at or
above the established condition levels are also
included.
For instance, in FY2005 Utah spent $308
million to maintain state roads and $54
million to maintain bridges. Presenting these
figures in the CAFR is a critical component
of the maintenance program, since it provides
information on cost of maintenance to
legislators, other elected officials, agency heads,
non-profit organizations, business leaders and
the general public.
Washington
The state of Washington has embarked on a
rigorous look at state maintenance practices.
The Washington State Department of
Transportation conducted customer (driver)
surveys in 2000 and again in 2005. The results
of the surveys have helped WSDOT focus on
those infrastructure components most in need of
repair. 29
Both the 2000 survey and 2005 survey indicated
that roadway surfaces had the most pressing
need to be improved. Most of the respondents
rated highway maintenance as average to above
average. The surveys are part of a Maintenance
Accountability Process (MAP) where in-house

Pioneer Institute for Public Policy Research

GASB 34: An Accounting Standard that Improves Asset Management?
New governmental accounting standards provide another potential avenue for addressing asset
management. In June 1999, the Government Accounting and Standards Board published Statement 34
(GASB 34), which set reporting standards for public entities and required them to depreciate their assets
using one of two methods – a “straight-line method” or a “modified method”
The straight-line method is based on historical costs and straight-line depreciation of assets. The
Commonwealth has selected this method for its financial reporting and is recommending that local
governments use it as well. (MASS 2001, p.6-9)
The modified method is a more labor-intensive system of reporting that requires entities to have an asset
management system and regular reporting on the effect of maintenance efforts. The asset management
system must be comprehensive, up-to-date, and provide guidance on required maintenance expenditures.
Although this system is clearly more complex and difficult to administer, it provides a more accurate
picture of the true state of an entity’s assets.
Using the Commonwealth’s straight-line method, no condition evaluations are required and, after its
40-year life (as determined for the purposes of accounting standards), an asset, such as the Tobin Bridge,
falls off the financial report. Thus the current CAFR contains no information on any asset older than 40
years.
Using Capital Asset Inventory Control (the “modified method”) in the future could result in better
financial reporting and a better accounting for maintenance and preservation of capital assets.

condition surveys assess the maintenance
levels that exist at any given point in time.
These surveys assess a broad range of metrics
- pavement condition, function of drainage
structures, condition of bridges, vegetation
levels, etc. These assessments are collected
quarterly in a report, known as “The Gray
Notebook,” which presents the metrics in a
simple format, and also includes additional
detail for expert study.

In addition, recently enacted legislation
requires the Washington State Department of
Transportation to utilize a life-cycle cost model
for all of its capital assets. All assets must be
inspected and updated for asset condition at least
every three years. 31
Virginia
The Commonwealth of Virginia has studied the
issue of deferred maintenance for several years. 32
In response to legislation passed by the
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General Assembly (Chap 4, Section C. 194.1
of the Special Session) the Virginia Auditor
of Public Accounts (APA) issued an interim
report in December 2004. That report contained
a summary of state-owned buildings and
compared Virginia’s Building Life Cycle with
an Ideal Building Life Cycle. A final report
was issued in December of 2005 indicating
that 5,269 of Virginia’s 10,449 buildings had a
deferred maintenance backlog of $1.626 billion.
State Infrastructure Banks
With the passage of ISTEA, the 1995
transportation funding authorization, the
Federal Highway Administration encouraged
formation of State Infrastructure Banks to
fund transportation projects. Originally
limited to 10 pilot states, the program has
proven highly successful. The states involved
in the pilot program capitalized their banks
with a combination of federal funds, state
appropriations and bond proceeds.
In concept, a SIB is similar to a revolving
fund. Capitalized funds are placed in the bank
and then loaned out to qualified borrowers.
Payments made back to the bank in the form
of capital and interest are then loaned out to
new borrowers. In the latest 2005 federal
transportation reauthorization act, called
SAFETEA-LU, all states are eligible to establish
an SIB and Massachusetts has legislation
pending.
The SIB can also issue letters of security or loan
guarantees to borrowers who wish to finance
through private sources such as a bank or private
trust. Borrowers can be public entities such as
cities, towns or regional agencies, or private
entities like railroads or private toll road
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builders. By providing such funds, significant
leveraging of private investments can occur. The
pending legislation in Massachusetts proposes
a Board of Trustees including the Secretary of
Administration and Finance, the Secretary of
Transportation, the State Treasurer and a fourth
member appointed by the Governor, possibly
with the consent of the Senate.
Proposed projects must be approved by
an advisory board, which may consist of
the appointees of the Co-Chairmen of the
Legislature’s Joint Committee on Transportation,
and the Directors of the Metropolitan Planning
Organizations.
States that have created an SIB have moved
ahead of Massachusetts in providing for
transportation infrastructure. In Arizona, the
SIB was first capitalized in 1996 with $6.7
million in federal funds. By 1998, the SIB was
capitalized with $25.1 million in federal funds
and $2.4 million in matching state monies. 33
With interest earnings of $2.2 million, the SIB
account as of October 1998 was $39.7 million.
By 2006 the state had approved 53 loans for
transportation/economic development projects at
a value of $582 million. 34
In Texas, the state legislature authorized the SIB
in 1997. As of August 2000, the Texas SIB had
disbursed $39 million and made commitments of
nearly $26 million more. As of August 2000, the
SIB had a cash balance of roughly $197 million,
of which $171.5 million was not yet committed
to projects. Today the Texas SIB has approved
67 loans, totaling $294.9 million which have
leveraged more than $2.03 million. 35
With a focus on economic development and
transportation needs, the proposed
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Massachusetts State Infrastructure Bank could
provide significant leveraging power in helping
cities and towns to solve the maintenance and
replacement needs of aging transportation
facilities.
Massachusetts
This study chronicles many of the problems
faced by Massachusetts in the area of asset
maintenance. There has been some attempt
to address these problems. In the mid-‘90s,
the Massachusetts House Ways & Means
Committee began to explore options for
increasing budgeting for maintenance. The
initiative that resulted in the CAMIS database
grew out of this period. A Capital Maintenance
Reserve was created and funded with $12
million for a single fiscal year, but was
eliminated in the following fiscal year.
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6. Conclusion
The Longfellow Bridge is in sad shape, in part
because of age and weather conditions, but
mostly due to our neglect of maintenance. It
serves as a crucial artery for the city, carrying
almost 50,000 vehicles per day plus 100,000
Red Line riders. Yet, it has only received two
significant rehabilitation efforts in a hundred
years, totaling $23.5 million in 2007 dollars.
The results of this neglect are troubling: massive
deterioration of key structural components of the
bridge, significant cracking in the stone piers,
and potential settling of the foundation. Fixing
these problems is currently estimated to cost
$180 million to $200 million, with the potential
for huge cost escalation if additional problems
are found.
Applying industry standard life-cycle cost
scenarios to the bridge demonstrates that a
regular program of maintenance would have
extended its useful service life and lowered the
Commonwealth’s overall costs.
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The decay of the Longfellow is symptomatic
of a problem that threatens most of the
Commonwealth’s assets. These assets suffer
from a maintenance backlog in the tens of
billions of dollars. We lack a centralized system
to comprehensively manage our assets. Our
financial reporting system lacks procedures
for condition assessment of these assets. The
responsibility for their maintenance is highly
compartmentalized and responsibility for
maintenance can be unclear. Most importantly,
we either fail to budget for maintenance, or
discourage upkeep by forcing state managers
to fund maintenance out of annual operating
budgets.
Furthermore, there is no statewide plan in place
to stop the problem from growing worse. Every
new structure that is built, every road that is
paved, every new asset of the Commonwealth
is currently doomed to decay for lack of
maintenance.
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7. Recommendations
7.1 A Recommendation for 		
Immediate Reform
Until the Commonwealth has a system in place
to measure, fund, and address the maintenance
needs of its assets, it should only begin a
building project when it has a comprehensive
life-cycle maintenance and capital replacement
plan in hand. This plan must detail the annual
operating and maintenance investments
that are required to keep the facility in good
condition. Our failure to maintain our assets
has actually driven up infrastructure costs, as
the risk of catastrophic failure forces us to fund
emergency repairs. Building new assets without
a comprehensive maintenance plan merely
exacerbates the problem.

7.1 Recommendations for 		
Systemic Reform: 		
Measure, Budget, Execute
Measure
The Executive Office of Administration
and Finance should, in cooperation with
the Executive Office of Transportation and
Public Works, and the Division of Capital
Asset Management, prepare a report on asset
conditions, condition trends, maintenance efforts
and maintenance plans for each department and
authority by asset class. The report should be
presented to the Governor and general public.
This report should be updated on a yearly basis,
and present in a digestible format: the status of
assets by department, including maintenance
efforts performed over the previous year, funds
expended, and the progress (or lack thereof)
in maintenance levels from previous years. A
model program would be the Washington State

Department of Transportation’s Gray Notebook
accountability program.
(see http://www.wsdot.wa.gov/accountability/).
As part of this report, the amounts expended
by each department on maintenance should
be included and tracked on a yearly basis (and
matched to specific assets where possible).
Changes to the state accounting system
already allow some automatic tabulation of
maintenance-related spending. To the extent
feasible, further changes to the system should
be made to allow for transparent budgeting,
expenditure, and tracking of maintenance
spending.
Another option to be considered is the
implementation of the modified method of
GASB 34 reporting, which would require
comprehensive usage of asset management
systems. This would insure that condition
assessments would be conducted and the value
of public assets would be measured.
Budget
The Executive Office for Administration and
Finance should work to reverse the existing
disincentives that discourage the use of
operating funds for maintenance and actively
reward those agencies that are working
diligently on maintenance. Each state agency
having use of and responsibility for maintenance
of any capital asset should include in its annual
operating budget an amount equal to 2 percent
of the replacement value for its capital assets.
(Note that this is not 2% of total program
budgets.) On or before the beginning of each
fiscal year, each agency should submit to
the division a plan for addressing deferred
maintenance for each such capital asset.
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A Commonwealth Facilities Maintenance
Reserve Fund should be established, beginning
with only 0.1 percent of the general fund in the
first year and rising 0.1 percent per year to 1
percent of the general fund in the 10th year.
The Legislature and Governor should continue
to utilize budgetary surpluses to perform payas-you-go capital maintenance projects. This is
sound budgeting practice as it utilizes one-time
sources of funds to address existing maintenance
needs, rather than creating a liability in future
years that must be included in future budgets.
Execute
Maintenance accountability issues in
Massachusetts stem from several systemic
problems, including a lack of centralized,
accessible data and the diffusion of
responsibility for asset maintenance. The lack
of data is a larger problem where ownership
is distributed among multiple agencies and
authorities. With diffusion of ownership comes
diffusion of maintenance responsibility, some of
which lies with DCAM and some of which lies
with the individual agencies and authorities.
The Governor should establish general
principles for infrastructure maintenance to be
followed by all state infrastructure agencies,
and should charge the Executive Office of
Transportation and Public Works and the
Division of Capital Asset Management with
responsibility for establishing a process to more
fully develop and oversee guidelines that require
each state agency to plan for maintenance, and
make regular public reports on the magnitude of
unfunded maintenance needs.
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The Governor’s Office should empower DCAM
to fulfill its statutory ability to monitor the
state’s asset maintenance. DCAM’s operating
funds were effectively pulled during the
budget process several years ago, a clear signal
of the agency’s relative political weakness.
For DCAM to properly manage state assets
would require not only increased funding for
operations, but also a public expenditure of
political capital to empower the agency.
The existing CAMIS database represents an
underutilized resource. Funds for maintenance
should only be made available for projects
included in the CAMIS database. The Governor
should issue an Executive Order compelling all
state agencies and authorities (with the exception
of those using another asset management
system, such as PONTIS and FAMIS) to take
advantage of CAMIS.
Lastly, the Governor’s Office and the Executive
Office for Administration and Finance should
make a sustained effort to make maintenance a
priority for program managers, and rewarding
them and their programs for sustained
improvements in maintenance practices and
asset condition.
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